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The Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches were among the last North American tribes 
to submit to reservation life. Even after they had formally agreed to settle on a 
reservation in southwest Oklahoma, several bands ofKiowas and Comanches waged war 
against the United States Army to protect their nomadic way of life. The Quahadas, a 
band oftbe Comanches, roamed northern and eastern Texas until dwindling food supplies 
forced them to submit to the Indian Agent at Fort Sill in 1875. Historians contend that 
after barely surviving repeated government attempts at assimilation, these once proud 
masters of the plains became "apathetic wards of the United States." Any process that 
transforms a people so drastically in a generation is certainly worthy of study. 
Why was the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache (KCA) reservation the last in 
Oklahoma to succumb to allotment ifthe Indians did not care about th ir fate? Pressure 
from land-hungry Buro-American settlers prompted Congress to break several treaties in 
, 
order to make available more land, why then, did they not begin with the KCA 
reservation where the Indians were indifferent. According to historians such as William 
. T. Hagan, the Indian Rights Association and special interest groups such as a 
conglomeration of wealthy Texas ranchers were responsible for the reservation's 
extended life. However, it is difficult to imagine the Indians who so violently resisted 
relocation to a three million acre reservation submitting to allotments of 160 acres 
without a fight. And fight they did. Through the leadership ofmen like Quanah Parker, 
the Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches staged a surprisingly successful resistance to 
III 
assimjlatioll through severalty. Rather than destroying the Indians' morale, government 
attempts to assimilate the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Indians strengthened their 
efforts to resist allotment. 
Once the Indians had been confmed to the reservation, the government began the 
process of assimilation. A series of under-funded, half-hearted attempts to force an 
agricultural lifestyle on a formally uneducated people with various herds of livestock and 
plows failed miserably in. the semi-arid grasslands ofwestern Oklahoma. Near starvation 
at several times throughout the 1880s, the Indians turned to leasing their land for alternate 
income. Having overcome the government's first attempts to assimilate the Indians, they 
prepared for a second attempt. The Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 became the principal 
instrument of the government's program for assimilation: Force the Indians to become 
self sufficient by imposing severalty through allotments and then weaning them off 
government annuities in the fonn of fanning supplies, clothing, and foodstuffs. After 
being forced to make an agreement for the cession of their surplus lands, or land 
remaining after they had taken allotments, the Indians again attempted to overcome the 
government's assimilation program, and in so doing, learned the skills necessary to 
, 
survive among the Euro-American who would settle their reservation. Despite the 
repeated attempts to force the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches to assimilate, these 
Indians developed the skins necessary to interact with the dominant society to affect 
desired changes. 
The Kiowa Agency files, located at the Oklahoma Historical Society, comprise 
the majority of sources used in th~s project. This vast collection includes personal 
correspondence of the reservation's inhabitants, minutes of tribal councils, and official 
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correspondence with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Through the unaltered minutes 
oftlle tribal councils, it is possible to detennine the motivations behind many oftlle 
Indians' actions. Personal and official correspondence to and from the various agents of 
the KCA reservation provide an indication of the development of tbe Indians as 
ascertained through the eyes of the assimilationists. This correspondence also illustrates 
the symbiotic relationship between Quanah Parker and various reservation officials. 
Although they usually used translators, many of the documents in this collection contain 
the opinions, ideas, and fears ofthe Indians. When available, these documents are 
preferred. The Indian Rights Association papers, also used extensively in this research, 
provided information on the activities of the, "friends of the Indians." These records 
revealed some of the motivations for the IRA's attempts to preserve the KCA reservation. 
The ninth chapter of William T. Hagan's Taking Indian Lands, published in the spring of 
2003, bears a striking resemblance to the second chapter of this thesis, but because this 
book was unavailable until after I had finished my work, I was unable to foresee this 
difficulty. Although our primary focus, and thus our conclusions, are different, much of 
the text is remarkably similar. 
Writing this thesis, I incurred debts to many people. Dr. Mary Jane Ward of the 
Oklahoma Historical Soc.iety offered countless valuable suggestions for further research 
and assisted in the search for elusive documents. The staff of the Western History 
Collection at the University of Oklahoma gladly made countless trips to unknown places 
to retrieve documents. Oklahoma State University's library staff also provided valuable 
assistance. Helen Clements was of particular assistance in working with the Indian 
Rights Association Papers. 
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, I would be remiss if I failed to thank Susan Oliver and Diana Hover who, as 
departmental secretaries, have "greased the skids" on more than one occasion. The 
support of the graduate community, particularly Jeremy Austin, Swm KoduUlthara, Todd 
Leahy, and Megan Stewart has been vital to the completion of this project. Each of the 
members of my advisory committee contributed uniquely to this work. Dr. Michael 
Smith offered guidance throughout my stay at this university. Dr. Richard Rohrs helped 
me through some of the intricacies of historical methods and motivated me to produce 
quality work; and Dr. L.G. Moses has patiently guided this work from its inception to 
completion. 
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Chapter I 
THE ROAD TO THE JEROME AGREEMENT 
In an effort to introduce order into the often chaotic process ofopening Indian 
lands to white settlement, a 1901 lottery decided who would, and who would not, get 
homesteads in what had been the home of the Kiowas, Comanches, and Kiowa-Apaches 
(usually written simply as "Apaches") for over thirty years. Boomers throughout Texas, 
Kansas, and Oklahoma territory claimed a flnal victory over the Indians and prepared to 
invade the rich grasslands of southwestern Oklahoma; but their victory had not come 
easily. The Indians of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache (KCA) reservation spent most 
of the 18905 in a united struggle against the ratification of the controversial Jerome 
agreement, a document by which Congress hoped to legalize the seizure of the "surplus" 
lands of the KCA reservation. The final decade of the nineteenth century, described by 
historians as a prosperous time on the reservation because of the increased income due to 
lease payments, also saw the rapid development of political resistance to allotment that 
was innovative, organized, and successful. I 
The Indian policy of the United States changed throughout the nineteenth century 
. to accommodate the needs of an expanding population. As EUIo-American settlers 
moved into Indian Lands west of the Appalachians, removal became the most convenient 
means to deal with the Indians. The Trail of Tears led many eastern Indians to a region 
known as Indian Territory, located on the Great Plains. There they joined a variety of 
other tribes and shared the land largely free of white influence. In the 1850s conflict 
1 
increased between Euro-Americans and Indians as speculators and settlers traveled west 
to Oregon and California through Indian territory. The government again sought to find 
an acceptable Indian policy, but efforts were postponed with the advent of the Civil War. 
Afterwards, Congress established a Peace Commission to treat with the plains tribes to 
"remove the causes of war, secure the frontier, and establish a system for civilizing tbe 
tribes.',2 
The treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek, Kansas, (1867) officially ended the free 
reign of the Kiowas and Comanches on the southern plains. Three days of negotiations 
produced a treaty in which the Indians ceded over 80 percent of their bunting grounds. In 
re~ the seven-man peace commission promised schools to educate the children, 
agricultural supplies to aid the Indians in their march toward Euro-American civilization, 
and annuities in the fonn of clothing and foodstuffs to replace the thinning herds of 
buffalo.) The treaty assigned members of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa-Apache 
tribes to a reservation of almost three million acres surrounding tbe Wi.chita Mountains in 
southwestern Indian Territory; but the [ndians who had ruled the southern pLains for over 
a century did not easily submit to the government's ear,liest plans to restrict their 
territorial boundaries. 
Because of an alliance among tbe tribes, the Kiowas', Comanches, and Kiowa-
Apaches had controlled the southern plains since 1790. The Kiowas ancestral homeland 
was in southern Montana where they allied themselves with the Kiowa-Apaches. They 
depended on antelope and elk for sustenance, but as they mastered their skills with the 
horse, they migrated south in pursuit of the buffalo and adapted to life on the plains with 
the help of the Crow, Cheyenne, and Arapaho tribes. In 1790, the Kiowas allied 
2 
themselves with the Comanches and pushed the remaining aboriginal tribes out of eastem 
Texas and Oklahoma, western New Mexico, and southern Colorado. The Kiowas and 
Comanches were without equal as mounted warriors and earned a reputation among 
Euro-American observers as the most "blood-thirsty" of the plains Indians despite their 
relatively small numbers.
4 
Tribal government was limited among the Kiowas and Comanches. Small, 
autonomous bands, led by a warrior chief and medicine man, migrated seasonally 
throughout the plains in search of food or intruders. The Kiowas, who gathered annually 
for the Sun Dance, a ceremony attended by all the bands of the celebrating tribe, were 
more centralized than the Comanche who did not practice the Slill Dance Religion. 
Young men in both tribes could ascend to leadership positions through acts of bravery in 
war and by displaying compassion for the less fortunate members oftheir bands. 5 A 
tribal council, headed by a principal chief and convened during the Sun Dance, hunts, and 
when critical circumstances confronted the tribe, advised local chiefs on certain matt rs; 
but their words held little sway ifthe local chief did not agree with them. The United 
States government dealt only with the tribal chiefs at ~edicine Lodge Creek, and by so 
doing, obtained an agreement that had little influence among many of the bands ofthe 
Kiowas and Comanches, several of which were not in attendance at the negotiations.6 
Although the promise of annuities drew most of the Indians onto the reservation 
for brief intervals, the Quahada band of the Comanches resisted resettlement, without the 
benefit of government rations, until June of 1875. Several bands of Kiowas and 
Comanches, such as the one led by Kicking Bird (Kiowa), used the reservation as a safe 
haven from which to launch raids against the Texans to the south. Inspired by the free-
3 
roaming Quahadas, the Indians attacked settlers and returned to their new homelands to 
rest their newly acquired horses and regain their strength without fear ofreprisals from 
their victims who were not allowed on the reservation. As the requests for help 
increased, the government sent General Phillip Henry Sheridan to force the Quahadas and 
several other independent bands onto the reservation.? Colonel Ranald Mackenzie 
commanded one ofthe three columns assigned to tbe task. He and his men dealt a 
crippling blow to the Quahadas when he overran their camp and destroyed about 2,000 of 
their horses.
8 
Having evaded the solqiers for over a year, the Quahadas. led by Quanah 




The Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Reservation: 1867-1901 
Figure 1 
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Although they occasionally ventured into Texas to hunt buffalo or to visit friends 
among the Cheyennes, the reservation became the permanent home ofthe Kiowas, 
Comanches, and Apaches. Its boundaries were the North Fork ofthe Red River on the 
West; the Red River on the south; the ninety-eighth meridian 011 the east; and the Washita 
River most ofthe north. 10 The government maintained a garrison at Fort Sill to protect 
the Indians from intruders and put down any insurrections among the reservation's legal 
inhabitants. The agency, originally located just east of Fort Sill, consolidated with the 
Wichita agency in Anadarko and in 1878 relocated to that tOWIl, at the northern border of 
the reservation. 
The agent's primary responsibility was to make certain that the Indians "advanced 
in the ways ofcivilization.,,11 Military officers replaced Quakers as the preferred Indian 
agents in the late 1870s. Although the agent was the ranking official on the reservation, 
Fort Sill's garrison was beyond his authority. Disagreements between the agent and the 
commanding officer were common, and cooperation between the two was, at best, 
sporadic. 
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The agent licensed and supervised any non-Indian presence on the 
reservation. The agency served as the only official conduit between Indians and the 
federal government; but as will be shown, the Indians. as well as officers from the fort, 
found ways to circumvent the agent's authority. 
The agent also had the responsibility of supervising the tribal government ofthe 
reservation. He submitted recommendations to the Commissioner ofIndian affairs for 
local positions from Principal Chief to Judge on the Court ofIndian Offenses. Inter-tribal 
councils served as the basic political unit ofthe reservation and became the seat of the 
Indians' resistance to assimilation. These councils, attended by members of all three 
5 
tribes, passed tribal legislation, allocat'ed money for public projects, hired lawyers, chose 
delegations to Washington, and served as an arena for aspiring Indian politicians. Each 
male in attendance had a vote, but only the most respected chiefs spoke, and the 
electorate usually supported the consensus of the chiefs unanimously. 
In the years immediately following the surrender ofthe Quahadas, the Indians of 
the KCA reservation endured dramatic changes to their way of life. The buffalo, a staple 
ofthe Kiowa and Comanche cultures, had virtually disappeared from the southern plains 
by 1879.
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Government efforts to break down the Indian's identification with his or her 
band were l.argely successful. Speakers in tribal councils identified themselves as 
Comanche or Kiowa, not Quahada or Yamparika. Horse thieves from Texas raided the 
reservation, but despite the soldiers' efforts to track and identify the criminals, judges 
south ofthe Red River were not sympathetic to the Indians, who bad only a decade 
before been the raiders. The United States government also falled to carry out most of 
the duties assigned it in the Medicine Lodge Treaty. The treaty called for the government 
to build a school for every thirty Indian children. There was only one on the reservation 
in 1875 and only three had been built by 1890. 
14 
Congress failed to appropriate sufficient 
funds for housing, agricultural development, and, most importantly, rations. Because of 
money shortages, the Indians spent three days of every week in transit to and from the 
agency to pick up rations that were insufficient to feed their families. Although the 
Indians did not choose to apply themselves to an agricultural lifestyle, the days wasted on 
the road would have prevented any success in growing crops or herding animals. IS 
Realizing that the climate, as well as the people, were averse to fanning, government 
officials purchased 3,600 sheep and goats to promote ranching among the Kiowas and 
6 
Comanches. This program ended a year later when, due to predators, flooding, and 
negligence, only thirty of the original herd was alive. Lacking rations, the Indians also 
slaughtered or sold the stocker cattle provided by the govemment. 16 Throughout the 
18705 and 1880s, the Indians of the KCA reservation developed distrust for the federal 
government as they suffered from malnutrition and sickness because of inadequate 
funding. 
Weakened by insufficient rations and disillusioned by the government's 
unwillingness to fulfill its treaty ob igations, the Indians also suffered as Texas ranchers 
invaded their rich grasslands. By 1882 there were at least 50,000 cattle grazing illegally 
on the reservation. Soldiers and Indian police were unable to patrol the entire 
reservation. In the face of additional cuts to the agency's budget, Agent P.B. Hunt 
approached the cattlemen with an unauthorized proposition. In exchange for grazing 
privileges, the ranchers were to deliver 340 head to supplement the rations for the 
Indians. 17 Having successfully drawn income from the reservation's rich grasslands, 
Hunt attempted to gain official authorization to arrange leases at six cents an acre. After 
consulting the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs responded to Hunt's 
request ambiguously. Although an official lease needed congressional approval, if the 
Indians approved such an agreement, the United States government had no power to 
prosecute the cattlemen. Thus, the commissioner did not approve the lease, but neither 
did he deny the agent permission to continue. This became Washington's policy towards 
leasing well into the next decade. 18 
With tacit approval from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Agent Hunt sought 
the approval ofthe Indians. The ensuing struggle between the anti-leasing and pro-
7 
leasing factions became the first opportunity on the reservation for the Kiowas, 
Comanches, and Apaches to develop the skills they would perfect in their effort to 
prevent ratification of the Jerome agreement. Although the ranchers would remain on the 
reservation with the agent's approval until 1901, the debate among the Indians raged 
throughout the 1880s. Kiowas, who occupied the northern areas of the reservation, 
comprised most ofthe anti-leasing faction. The Kiowa chiefLone Wolf (Mamay-da-ty) 
was accompanied by Tabananaka, White Wolf, and Cheevers, respected Comanche 
chiefs, in leading the anti-leasing faction, which Special Agent Paris Folsom found to be 
in the majority.19 Quanah Parker, Eschiti, and Pennansu, all Comanches, led the pro-
leasing faction. Backed by the agent and Texas cattlemen, who provided both money and 
an education in negotiations, the pro-leasing faction was successful in the face of superior 
numbers. 
The anti-leasing faction maintained its position in tribal councils, but was unable 
to stop the leases. In a letter to Agent Hunt, Niasto, who did not support leasing, reported 
that despite all their talk there "ape two parties, one party is large but the other one is 
small. I am on the large side and we are the ones that.. .don't want [to lease] the land 
now.,,20 He continued with a complaint that two white men had attended their council 
and had tried to cODvince the Indians to support a lease. He closed with a request to "stop 
[the talking] about this land business.',21 In another effort to end the leases, a group of 




determined tribal leadership, their demands had little chance ofbecoming reality. Agent 
Hunt, who also supported leasing, was not likely to recommend the displacement ofllis 
8 
allies in the reservation's government. In a show ofprotest, a majority of the Kiowas and 
some of the Comanches refused to accept any payment from the leases. 
23 
The pro-leasing faction, initially in the minority, was able to decide the course of 
action for the entire reservation, primarily because they aligned themselves with the 
agent. Agent Hunt, convinced he had the best interests ofthe Indians in mind, aJIowed 
the ranchers to build permanent corrals as early as 1883, before he had even received 
approval from the Commissioner ofIndian Affairs. Hunt, who by 1883 had served as 
Indian Agent for five years, could, if.supported by the commanding officer at Fort Sill, 
operate the reservation like a monarchy. In the years to follow, agents would come and 
go much more often, greatly reducing their influence on the reservation. Agent Hunt 
resi.gned in August 1885, due to political pressure from the new Republican 
administration. Administrative instability marked the reservation and plagued the Indians 
for the next ten years. By November of 1894, nine men had served as Indian agent on the 
KCA reservation?4 
Quanah Parker, the leader of the pro-leasing faction, used this opportunity to 
cultivate his relationship with government officials on the reservation as well as with the 
Texas ranchers. Through the leasing controversy, Parker effectively became the chief 
middleman of the reservation. The Indians oftbe reservation respected his opinioQS both 
becauseofhis exploitsas awarrior and becauseofhis expertise illdealing with agents 
and ranchers. Reservation officials sought Parker's help when they needed to influence 




white men, Parker learned the skill ofnegotiation and the habits and customs of 
9 
American business and politics. Funded by the cattlemen, Parker and a group of like-
minded Indians made several trips to Washington to lobby the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs for support ofthe leases. On these trips, Parker made important contacts in 
Washington and acquainted himself with governmental procedures. Having become 
comfortable in both the Indian and white worlds, Parker found himself at the center ofthe 
reservation's political system as the demands for severalty began to threaten the Indians' 
way oflife. 
J. Lee Hall became the KCA reservation's third agent in 1885 and immediately 
confronted the problem ofwhite intruders on the reservation by requesting assistance 
from the federal government. The Commissioner ofIndian Affairs promptly responded, 
agreeing with the agent that "the ever increasing presence of white men on Indian 
reservations...isone ofthemostcomplex features in the Indian service.,,26 Agents faced 
difficulties in allowing "respectable" whites onto the reservation to aid the Indians in 
their efforts to farm and to acquire certain technical skills and at the same time preventing 
thieves and other scoundrels from coming onto the reservation to steal meager lease 
payments and annuities. Work permits allowed the elderly inhabitants ofthe reservation 
to hire white workers to maintain farms, but these workers often used the permits as a 
way to gain entrance to the reservation only to exploit its resources. A letter from the 
Commissioner ofIndian Affairs dated 6 February 1888 directed Agent E. E. White to 
investigate a report of"numerous persons prospecting for minerals" on the reservation 
and "take such steps as may be necessary to clear the reservation ofaU such person.,,27 
Inter-tribal councils became a forum for complaints against intruders who stole tinlber 
cattle, and horses, sold alcohol, or simply squatted on tribal land. These intmders, a 
10 
significant problem in themselves, were only a symptom ofa much larger threat to the 
reservation. 
By 1890, the reservations ofsouthwestem Oklahoma represented the last ofthe 
readily available land for homesteading in the United States.
28 
Boomers called for the 
opening ofthe reservation to make room for "industrious" white settlers, and Congress, 
aware of the consequences ofinaction, created a three-man commission to negotiate the 
sale ofall surplus lands in Oklahoma. The Cherokee Commission, named in honor of its 
first victims, dealt with eleven reserv~tions and reached agreements with each group 
except the Osages?9 After completing its first assigned task, the group became known as 
the Jerome Commission in honor ofits chainnan, fOimer Michigan Governor David H. 
Jerome; Alfred Wilson and Warren Sayre, both considerably less experienced in dealing 
with the Indians than Jerome, were the other two members ofthe commission. They 
arrived on the KCA Reservation in October of 1892 having already dealt with nine 




YOU HAVE MISSED THE ROAD 
Despite its poor reputation among the Indians, the Jerome Commission hoped to 
find a friendly reception when it began negotiations on the KCA reservation. The 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs directed Agent George Day "to issue requisite rations to 
enable Indians to remain in council until a conclusion is reached with the Cherokee 
Commission.") Having grown accustomed to the chronically insufficient rations, the 
Indians might have looked upon the arrival of the commission, and the subsequent 
increase in rations, as a blessing. However, despite the government's efforts to alleviate 
the Indians' most basic concern, hunger, the lead'ers ofthe Kiowa, Comanche, and 
Apache, seasoned by their negotiations with the ranchers, did not readily accept the 
commission's proposal. Despite the Indians' unwiHingness to assent to the agreement, 
the members of the Jerome Commission completed its mission and successfully arranged 
an agreement through threats, faulty logic, and, most importantlY,careful control oftbe 
meetings. 
The Jerome Commission obtained what it believed to be the requisite number of 
signatures in eleven meetings with the Indians ofthe reservation held over a period of 
three weeks. Edward L. Clark and Emsy S. Smith served as interpreters for the 
Comanches, and Joshua Given, a Kiowa, served as interpreter for his tribe and the 
Kiowa-Apaches. The sub-agency at Fort Sill hosted the first eight meetings; but because 
12 
most of the Kiowas lived in the northern part of the reservation and were not willing to 
travel to the sub-agency, the commission moved to Anadarko to procure the remaining 
signatures needed for ratification. On 17 October, the agreement received the requisite 
number of signatures, and the commission returned to Washington. 
The first council with the Jerome Commission, held on 26 September, opened 
with speeches from each ofthe three government negotiators,2 Governor Jerome's 
lengthy remarks began with an offer to recognize and seat any bi-lingual persons the 
Indians might prefer to monitor the accuracy of the official translators. He briefly 
recounted the provisions of the Dawes Act, explained how the commission had come to 
the reservation, and implored the Indians to ask questions if they did not understand the 
terms of the forthcoming agreement. He explained tbat Congress had given a great deal 
of thought to the Indians' plight and had devised a plan by which they might rapidly 
progress toward self sufficiency in mainstream America. Aware of the commission's 
dubious reputation among the Indians, he added that "the commissioners are not here to 
deal sharply with the Indians or to wrong the Indians or do anything that a father would 
not do with his child.,,3 Jerome's statement, combined with his seemingly genuine 
concern that the Indians would not understand the terms of the agreement, reveals the 
commission's underestimation of its opponent in the negotiations. This attitude would be 
addressed later in the proceedings as the commission continually failed to respect the 
Indians' attempts to reach a compromise. 
Alfred Wilson briefly addressed the assembly with words of kindness and 
assurances of the government's honorable illtentions. Speaking in short, simple 
sentences, Wilson focused primarily on the government's promise to help the Indians 
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"clear your fanns, build your houses, and raise your children.'.4 Most importantly, 
Wilson offered the Indians an opportunity to propose a counter offer if"you think this 
road that we point out .to you will not be the best."5 His statement proved to be an empty 
promise, an indication ofthe questionable integrity ofthe commissioners. Wilson's 
proposal provides another example ofthe commission's expectations on the first day of 
the meetings. Having already helped negotiate nine agreements with other tribes, he was 
aware that Congress had specific expectations from the commission and that a 
compromise acceptable to both the government and the Indians was not likely. 
Therefore, assuming he did not make the statement to mock the "negotiations," he must 
not have expected the Indians to submit an alternate plan, further illustrating the 
commission's underestimation ofthe Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches. 
Warren Sayre's opening statements, an indication ofthe dialogue to come, did not 
emphasize the benevolence of"the Great Father" or promise the Indians an opportunity 
to reach a compromise with the commission. He explained that "the Indians on 
reservations are and always have been poor and the white man living upon his fann is and 
always has been rich" and added that the government had decided to do away with the 
r,eservation system.
6 
Sayre then became the first to offer a more threatening argument for 
compliance. In an appeal that became more common as the councils continued. Sayre 
offered the Indians an opportunity to come to an agreement with the commission before 
the president, authorized by the Dawes Act, ordered the Indians to take allotments 
without the opportunity to sell their excess land. He explained that the Dawes Act had 
given the president the authority to make such an order, but "instead ofmaking such an 
order for the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches to take allotments, the President has sent 
14 
this commission here to make some arrangement with you so that he will not be required 
to make such an order:,7 He then reminded the Indians that the leases that supplied 
additional income were illegal without the support ofthe president. In a feeble effort to 
give the Indians a voice in the matter, Sayre offered them a choice: "Ifwe make an 
agreement or treaty, we will not go away until every Indian on the reservation that wants 
to knows everything that is in it. And ifwe don't make a trade or a treaty, we will stay 
here till [sic] we make every Indian on the reservation understand what the Government 
wants done."g And so they did. 
Before opening the floor to questions, Governor Jerome cautioned the Indians not 
to rush to a decision until they bad all tbe facts. He then offered to explain further any 
comments that they did not understand. Although the commission would not reveal the 
details of the proposition until half-way through the second council, the Indians, led by 
Quanah Parker, were eager to have specific infonnation to discuss among themselves 
after the first meeting. 
Tabananaka was the first to speak. A formerchiefofthe Yamparikaband ofthe 
Comanches, Tabananaka had taken an allotment and built a substantial estate.
9 
As a 
leader of the anti-leasing faction in the 1880s, Tabananaka had become familiar with 
inter-tribal politics and called upon old allies in his early opposition to the agreement. He 
acknowledged that he did not currently hold a position of leadership among the 
Comanches but observed that the agreement could not be reached quickly. He claimed 




Quanah Parker, through experience and political connections, continued the 
Indians' argument against tbe agreement. Parker re-iterated Jerome's warnings to the 
Indians about rash decisions --"do not go at this thing like you were riding a swift 
horse," he observed, "but hold up a little."II In the first ofmany efforts to persuade the 
commissioners that the Indians, or at least their leaders, were capable negotiators, he then 
,cautioned the ex-governor to heed his own advice: "[do] not think before you hear."J2 On 
a recent trip to Washington, Parker, White Man and Lone Wolf had met with the 
Commissioner ofIndian Affairs to discuss the Jerome Commission. The commissioner 
had warned the Indians that the Jerome Commission "may want to buy the land. They 
have not got any money, but want to buy it with mouth-shoot." He advised the Indians 
not to "be afraid to say what you think to them [the Jerome CommissionJ.,,13 In stating 
the fact that the commission had no money, Parker was addressing a contingent ofhis 
people who were eager to sell quickly because they needed money. Then, having 
relieved the pressure corning from that group, the Comanche chiefwas free to introduce 
his argument that the agreement should be postponed until the Treaty of Medicine Lodge 
Creek expired in 1897. Parker, ever the businessman, then asked how much the 
commission would pay for one acre, when it would be paid, and the exact terms ofthe 
agreement. 
Governor Jerome replied that the answers to Parker's questions would be given 
"by and by." The Chief ofthe Comanches was not about to be dismissed so easily. 14 
After pressing the matter and receiving assurances that the proposal would be presented 
in writing, Parker expressed his desire to "wait until the expiration oftbe other treaty." 




Lone Wolf, White Man, and "the other people." Parker, however, returned to his 
allotment to supervise some additional construction on his house. 15 
The second day ofnegotiations opened with a counter-proposal submitted by the 
Kiowa cbiefStumbling Bear. One ofthe two men in attendance who had signed the 
Treaty ofMedicine Lodge Creek, the Kiowa chief advised that the commission should 
return in four years, just before the expiration ofthe existing treaty. Jerome and his 
colleagues then attempted to minimize the effects allotment would have on the terms of 
the existing the treaty. They explained that the annuities and services provided for in the 
Medicine Lodge treaty would continue until the expiration date, but that assurance failed 
to mollify the Indians. They maintained that it would be best to delay the negotiations; 
furthermore, the decision to sell the land was their "privilege." Big Tree likened the 
reservation to a "very large and very fat. ..working horse: It can plow the ground and 
bring us some grain..... When we have to do anything that is beavy, we have to use him; 
and now you come and take this horse away from us; it is very hard for us to give this 
horseup. IfIweretocometoyourhouse...andattemptto buysomethingthat youprize 
very highly," he added, "you would probably laugh at me and tell me you were not 
anxious to sell it.,,16 Big Tree, like most of the other Indian speakers on the second day 
ofnegotiations, asserted his, and his peoples' right to reject the agreement. _ 
Undeterred in their purpose, the commissioners deflected the Indians' efforts to 
delay the negotiations until Parker again rose to speak. In a manner unique among the 
Indians at the Fort SiU Councils, Quanah Parker spoke directly, simply, and sometimes 
curtly to the Jerome Commission. Having observed a lengthy debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages ofdelaying tbe negotiations, Parker simplified the tenus for the 
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COmmJSSlon: "You do not seem to understand. A good many are opposed to making any 
trade for four years and you seem [to be] trying to press a sale on them. We know that 
the Medicine Lodge treaty will run out and that the annuities will run out, but the land 
will be good.,,17 Although the other Indian speakers at Fort Sill softened their messages 
by recognizing the commission as friends or acknowledging that the government knew 
the best way for the Indians, Parker addressed the cause of the difficulties in the 
negotiations: the commissioners were not only unwilling to negotiate, but also unwilling 
to accept the Indians' declared opinions-as legitimate concerns. 
Only after the continued prodding ofParker and several others did the 
commissioners begin to submit the details ofthe proposal, almost three days after the 
negotiations had started. The Jerome Agreement, as framed by the commission 
members, facilitated the civilization ofthe Indians by allowing them to sell their 
"surplus" lands and use the money to build houses and buy agricultural supplies. It 
allowed every man, woman, and child on the reservation to select 160 acres, in up to four 
parcels, [Tom any part ofthe reservation with the exception ofthe military reservation, 
the land on which the agency sat, the Wichita Mountains, and the land set aside for 
schools. IS The commission proposed a price oftwo million dollars for the surplus land, 
approximately two million acres. The agreement specified that the Indians were to . 
receive two hundred thousand dollars, or sixty-five dollars per person, within four months 
ofratification. After another payment oftwo hundred thousand dollars the following 
year, and one hundred thousand the third year, the hldians were to receive twenty-five 
dollars annually from the interest accumulated from remaining 1.5 million. The leases 
already in effect remained intact until congress ratified the agreement. At the time, a 
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good steer sold for about twenty-seven dollars; it is, therefore, easy to understand why the 
Indians were not eager to make such a trade. Few people would exchange the unimpeded 
use ofthree million acres for the equivalent of a single steer per annum. However, most 
of the Indians were not opposed to allotment in the future. They only wanted more time 
to prepare for contact with other Americans. Lone Wolfnoted, "When the worst comes, 
they [Parker. Tabananaka] will be the only ones that will be able to cope with the white 
man.,,19 
Parker again demanded more details in the negotiations, but the commissioners 
deflected his efforts. After Commissioner Sayre had explained the details ofthe 
agreement, Parker asked how much his people would receive per acre ofland sold to the 
government. An interesting exchange followed: 
Mr. Sayre: I can not tell you. 
Quanna [sic] Parker: How do you arrive at the number of million dollars 
ifyou do not know? 
Mr. Sayre: We just guess at it.
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Commissioner Sayre explained that the price per acre could not be detemlined until the 
number ofacres of"surplus" land had been detennined. The commission based its logic 
on the idea that the lump sum oftwo million dollars was fixed, and the price per acre was 
unimportant. This lump sum basis for buying land contt;adicted not only the accepted 
business practices, but also the expectations ofthe Indians, who had grown accustomed 
to setting a price for each acre, either a six cent per acre lease, or in this case, a one dollar 
per acre sale. Throughout the councils, the Indians continually asked to know the price 
the government was willing to pay for an acre ofland despite the Jerome Commission's 
efforts to base the negotiations on a lump sum. Given the fact that the Indians had easily 
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understood the commission's earlier explanations on eql1ally complex matters, it is safe 
to assume that they understood the lump sum logic bl1t were attempting to change the 
basis ofnegotiation. However, in this case, as in most others, they were unsuccessful. 
Governor Jerome opened the third council by urging the Indians to ask questions 
until they fully understood the proposition; but the headmen had not yet finished 
negotiating. Lone Wolf and White Man addressed the commissioners first with a final 
plea to resume the negotiations after the expiration ofthe Medicine Lodge Creek Treaty. 
Having exhausted his patience, Jerome finally resorted to threats. He warned them that if 
they refused the proposal, Congress would deal harshly with the Indians by forcing them 
to take allotments. He reminded them that "Congress is made up ofwhite men and ifthe 
Indians do not want to do what Congress want[sic] them to do, it is the most natural thing 
for Congress to say that the Indians will want something [rations] of us." He added that 
he hoped "that the good relations which have existed so long between the Indians and the 
Government ofthe United States will continue.,,21 This threat, not entirely empty, ended 
the requests ofthe Fort Sill Indians to delay the negotiations. 
Tabananaka,obviouslytired ofthe incessant condescension ofthecommission, 
began his speech bluntly: "I am not dressed like a white man, but you can hear what I 
have to say anyway.,,22 He resigned himself to the fact that he could not stop the 
commission's work but repeated Parker's question concerning the price per acre. After 
White Wolf, who had also signed the Medicine Lodge treaty, repeated the question a 
third time, the Jerome Commission produced an answer. According to their estimation, 
the Indians would receive approximately one dollar and ten cents per acre for the surplus 
23 lands.With this disclosure, the third day ofnegotiations closed. The commission had 
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revealed itself to the Indians. They realized that Sayre's promise to stay with the Indians 
until they understood (accepted) an agreement was one that the commissioners intended 
to keep. 
Iseeo, a Kiowa and a sergeant in the Indian police stationed at Fort Sill, was the 
first to address the commission on the fourth day ofnegotiations. Citing the experience 
ofthe Southern Cheyennes, who had given up their reservation in April of 1892, Iseeo 
presented the Indians' best argument against allotment.24 Because ofinsufficient rainfall, 
crops were inconsistent, and ranching was the most efficient way to use the land. If 
Indians depended on ranching, 160 acres was not a sufficient parcel on which to feed a 
family.25 Agents throughout the history ofthe reservation had pointed to this fact in their 
reports to the Commissioner oflndian Affairs, and Iseeo's argument was undeniably 
valid. Jerome must have realized this, because he responded by questioning the honesty 
ofthe Cheyennes and emphasizing the fact that they had only what the government had 
given them. Sayre quickly added that the Cheyennes had probably squandered their 
generous government checks on gambling and alcohol. He then closed the meeting with 
a lengthy speech on the financial benefits ofthe proposal. 26 
Iseeo's attempt to avoid the Jerome Agreement was the Fort Sill Indians' last 
effort. The Jerome Commission refused to deal with the Kiowas, Comanches, and 
Apaches as equals by, in effect, forcing them to sell their land. A condescending tone 
dominated the commission members' dialogue, despite the businesslike manner of 
Parker, Tabananaka and Iseeo. Lone Wolfs appeal to the sympathies ofthe commission 
in his plea for the protection ofthe less progressive Indians from the "crafty" white man 
was ignored. Tabananaka's effort to build a coalition with Lone Wolfand the Kiowas 
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failed in the face of an unyielding opponent. Finally, Iseeo's argument that the 
allotments were insufficient did not receive recognition from the commission's chairman, 
and thus was simply forgotten by the Indians. The Indians' arguments, substantiated or 
not, had fallen on unreceptive ears. Having decided that a Jerome Agreement was 
unavoidable, the Indians would use the remaining councils in an attempt to alter the 
original proposition. They called upon their business experience and legal knowledge to 
gain small but substantial victories in the Jerome Agreement. 
The Indians' efforts to modifY Je!ome's proposal began in earnest on the fifth day 
ofnegotiations. Tabananaka, the first Comanche to speak, represented those who viewed 
any attempts to negotiate as futile and a waste ofthe valuable time remaining before 
allotment. The chief ofthe Yamparika band told the commissioners that his people were 
"inclined to do as I do, because we know that Washington controls everything in the 
country.... I am ready at any time.... We wait on ,the government.,,27 Tabananaka was 
alone among the headmen in his capitulation to the commission. White Eagle proposed 
that the government pay $1.50 for the surplus lands. Quanah Parker then submitted a 
compromise that should have satisfied all parties. He suggested that ifa four-man panel 
consisting of a Comanche, a Kiowa, an Apache, and Parker's lawyer could have two 
months to scrutinize the agreement and then explain it "in their own tongue" to the 
headmen, they could more easily reach a decision. In an effort to make the proposition 
more attractive to the commission, Parker pointed out that the government paid them 
fifteen dollars a day while they were working with the Indians, and thus his request did 
not present an inconvenience "because this is Government business and the pay goes 
on.,,28 
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Governor Jerome, obviously surprised by Parker's suggestion, responded with a 
question: "Is there any certainty that you are going to have an attorney -will he be 
here?,,29 Parker confinned the lawyer's existence and his plans to arrive at the council 
that evening. Faced with the possibility ofencountering an opponent who could create a 
variety oflegal problems, Jerome employed a new tactic. Assuming, correctly, that 
Parker had acted on his own in procuring the services of the attorney, Jerome praised 
Parker for his good ideas and then cautioned the council that "whatever is done must be 
told to all the people, and all the people must take part in anything that is done toward 
making a contracL,,30 He promised to meet with the advisory committee, but did not 
expect congress to approve the two-month recess. 
Agent Day, in his first appearance at the negotiations, opened the sixth council 
with bad news for the Indians. Having met with the lawyer and John T. Hill, the agent 
reported that they had decided an attorney could not help the Indians with the 
negotiations. Hill had, to say the least, poor credentials as an advisor to the Indians, 
although they referred to him as a friend on more than one occasion in the councils. He 
aided the Kickapoos in their negotiations with the Jerome Commission, much to the 
detriment of the Indians, and then had filed suit against the tribe for $5,000 in exchange 
for services rendered.
J1 
He arrived on the KCA reservation with Jerome, and managed to 
procure the services of Emsy Smith, one ofthe official translators in the negotiations. 
Although rumors surfaced linking Hill, Parker's attorney, several of the Indians, and 
Joshua Given, the Kiowa translator, in a conspiracy to profit from the sale of tribal lands, 
there is little evidence in the proceedings to substantiate these claims. Having thrown 
their support behind Parker, the Kiowas were in favor ofthe proposed advisory panel. 
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According to Agent Day's testimony, he and Hill were the only ones to speak with the 
attorney.32 
The Indians' agent continued his speech with some advice for the Kiowas, 
Comanches, and Apaches. When given the choice between the Dawes Act and the 
Jerome Commission, Day recommended that the Indians sign the agreement, and he then 
suggested that they had "been here about long enough to begin to do some business." In 
parting, Day recommended that the Indians "make some provision for some white people 
that have lived here with them.,,33 His fi~al suggestion, later investigated by subsequent 
agents and the Commissioner ofIndian Affairs, prompted the Indians to add several 
Emo-American beneficiaries to the agreement. 
Tabananaka, Parker's o]d anti-leasing foe, offered some support for the agent and 
the attorney's decision not to participate in the negotiations. Tabananaka had consulted 
with the headmen. Although none ofthem knew who bad sent for the attorney, his 
speech does not indicate any disapproval among the chiefs. He asserted the Indians' 
ability to make up their own minds, and again pledged his support for the Jerome 
Agreement, on the condition that the government had the intentlon ofbestowing "a 
blessing upon us" with the agreement. Jerome responded with a simple message: "Ifthe 
Government has been good to you all times before, it will probably be as good to you· 
hereafter.,,34 
Some ofthe Kiowa headmen in attendance then offered some proposals. In an 
underhanded attempt to maintain the Treaty ofMedicine Lodge, Big Tree asked for a 
clause that would prevent the opening of the reservation for a period of three years after 
tbe ratification ofthe agreement. Komalty, a Kiowa, addressed the Indians' position 
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concerning the amount of money to be paid for the surplus lands. He proposed that 2.5 
million dollars would be more appropriate because the Wichita Mountains, despite the 
claims of the commission, were of some value. He cited the fact that the government had 
used rocks from the mountains to construct many ofthe buildings at Fort Sil1.
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Parker supported Komalty's arguments, but added severa] important points. 
Parker contended that the mountains could possibly contain mineral wealth; prospectors 
had been intruding on the reservation in search of gold, siLver, and coal for years. 
"Supposing Coal is found in the mounta~ns, what will Washington do with that ifit is 
worthLess." He also pointed out that two square miles for educational purposes in each 
town was a bit excessive. There was no benefit to the Indians, "except where school 
houses are bui]t.,,36 In an effort to obtain the additional five hundred thousand dollars 
Komalty mentioned, Parker suggested that the Indians send a delegation to the capital to 
plead their case when Congress convened that winter. 
The Jerome Commission offered an especially confusing response to the request 
for a three-year delay on the implementation ofthe agreement. They fust explained that 
because ofthe bureaucratic processes involved in the ratification of such an agreement, it 
would be at least two years until Congress could decide on the matter. Secondly, Sayre 
explained that the money from interest payments the Indians would sacrifice to maintain 
the reservation an additional three years could be used to make them all wealthy. The 
commission had frequently referred to the number of wagon]oads of silver represented in 
large figures such as the proposed two million dollars to impress th.e Indians. In tlns 
instance, however, Sayre quickly explained that unless the Indians made the deal as soon 
as possible, they would suffer in poverty "because you will not have the first $200,000, 
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and the second $200,000 and the $175,000 until [the Jerome Agreement] goes into 
effect. ,,37 
When the council reconvened the next day, the commission had prepared the final 
draft of the agreement. The Indians bad failed to effect many changes in the original 
proposal submitted by the Jerome Commission. Although the Indians received the 
mineral right to their allotments, the mountains remained the domain of the United States. 
The commission agreed to Parker's suggestion that Indians be allowed to present their 
argument for an additional five hundred thousand dollars to congress, but they included 
the stipulation that two sections be set-aside in each congressional township for 
educational purposes. The last section of the agreement included "a list ofwhite persons 
as you may name yourselves, who, because they have lived among you and learned your 
language, or married into your tribe or done you service, shall have a share of the land 
and money as you shall determine. ,,38 
Having submitted the final proposal, the commissioners expected the Indians to 
cease debate and sign the agreement. Tohauson, a heretofore-silent Kiowa chief, 
received a harsh reprimand from Governor Jeror:ne after making a final effort to stop the 
agreement. The old Kiowa explained that his father had wamed him not to sell any of the 
reservation to the whites, and that he did not support the agreement. Jerome, impatient 
with the Indians' attempts to frustrate his efforts, replied, "I assume, now, that all the 
Indians understand that all that do not want to trade under any circumstances need not 
weary us with their talk.,,39 Jerome answered inquiries from Parker and Tabananaka with 
equally abmpt responses, and the Indians retired to their camps to discuss the choice 
confronting them. 
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Finding themselves in the midst ofyet another retreat, the Indians, even before 
they had all signed the agreement, began to fonnulate strategies to call into question the 
legitimacy of the Jerome Commission's work. Several ofthese strategies would serve 
them well throughout the 1890s. Rumblings among the tribesmen indicated that the 
Indians felt they had been "bulldozed" into signing the agreement. Rumors that Joshua 
Given had translated falsely surfaced. Because of the anti-Jerome sentiments of the 
Kiowas in the north, some Indians questioned the commission's ability to obtain the 
required signatures, and others requested that their names be removed from the 
agreement. 
Although their methods were questionable, the Jerome Commission obtained the 
signatures ofmost of the Kiowas and all but a few of the Comanches in attendance at the 
Fort Sill councils. The members ofthe commission l1?-aintained absolute power over the 
Indians with which they dealt, and unlike congress, Jerome and his compatriots did not 
concern themselves with the ramifications of their actions. They were not inclined to 
sympathize with most of the Indians who would face certain poverty on their allotments; 
the government had given them an assignment, and they had a responsibility to complete 
that assignment. To that end, the commission used several questionable tactics to 
- minimize the Indians' bargaining power. The commission members succeeded in 
creating a false choice for the Indians. When Lone Wolf and others suggested that the 
commission return at the expiration ofthe Medicine Lodge Teaty, Jerome did not deny 
them that option. He only warned them that the President could force them to take 
allotments at any time. The choice then became: Sign the agreement now, or take 
allotments without payment for the surplus lands. Through its association with John Hill, 
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the commission exerted an uninvited influence on the Indians. Although there is no 
unequivocal proof, it is reasonable to assume that, because of its association with Hill and 
Agent Day, the decision not to accept the services of the attorney was influenced by the 
wishes of the commission. 
The Indians who attended the Fort Sill councils attempted to negotiate as equals 
with the Jerome Commission. Although they were largely unsuccessful, the experience 
furthered their development of a political resistance to allotments, and by extension, to 
assimilation. The monolithic commission proved an insumlountable obstacle for 
Parker's leadership skills and experience in negotiation; but he did not face an equally 
unbending opponent in the years between the agreement and its ratification. He therefore 
proved to be a powerful voice both on and off the reservation. In their attempts to 
prevent allotment, the Indians hired several lawyers to represent them. Such efforts had 
both good and bad results. Finally, because the divisiveness inherent in tribal politics 
contributed to the success of the commission, the Indians realized this weakness and, 
despite their continuing differences of opinion, did not suffer from it in their struggle 
against congressional ratification of the agreement. 
Despite the munn.urs that the Kiowas residing near the agency were hostile to the 
agreement, the Jerome Commission opened its first council there a few days later on 14 
October. As expected, the Kiowa Headmen were quite vocal in their opposition to the 
agreement. Ahpeahtone, an aspiring leader of the Kiowas, was the first to speak.40 He 
expressed the Kiowas' desire to wait for the expiration of the Medicine Lodge Treaty, 
and went so far as to call a stand-up vote to show the commission the degree of 
opposition to the agreement. Most of the Kiowas responded by standing and Ahpeahtone 
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summarized, "We have voted against the contract. ... That treaty was made solemnly, and 
we would travel on it, and have voted solidJy against the contract.'''') Satekeah, Amotaah, 
and Judge Chaddlekonke, the Kiowa representative on the Court oflndian Offenses, 
echoed Ahpeatone's sentiments. Having dealt with this problem before, Governor 
Jerome then asked if there were any other concerns with the new agreement. Flying 
Crow reminded the commission that the Indians were unprepared for contact with 
dishonest white men and would not survive without the protection ofthe reservation. Big 
Bow, who had attended many ofthe Fo~ Sill meetings, mentioned the impossibility of 
surviving on a l60-acre allotment. In a show of futility, Little Robe protested against the 
treaty while admitting the had "heard ofyour talk and know what you would say 
tomorrow...Iknowwhatthe answers will be.,,42 
On 15 October, Governor Jerome opened the meeting with a rebuttal of the 
accusations against Joshua Given. Many of the Kiowa had already begun to question 
Given's translation, and because the proceedings could not be finished with a new 
interpreter, Jerome seated three supervisors to monitor Given's translation.
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The rumors 
against the Kiowa interpreter started after Big Tree's proposal for a three-year delay in 
the allotment process did not appear in the Jerome agreement. Big Tree, and some ofthe 
other Kiowas, alleged that Given had intentionally mis-translated the agreement to make 
the proposal more palatable to the Indians. Despite the growing controversy surrounding 
Given's translation, it is unlikely that he intentionally mislead his fellow tribesmen. 
Jerome had also prepared a solution to the problem he faced with the strong 
leadership ofthe Kiowas, but he discovered a new problem with those who favored the 
Medicine Lodge Treaty. He addressed the alleged threats ofphysical violence on anyone 
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wbo signed the agreement and promised swift punishment for those who carried out the 
threats. He then emphasized the importance ofindividualism among white men and 
suggested that the Indians should shed their loyalties to their leaders. Calling on the 
young men to act as they chose instead of listening to the chiefs, Jerome attempted to 
break: down the tribal customs that the government had relied on to subdue the Quahadas 
fifteen years earlier. In a further excw-sion into tribal politics, Jerome suggested that if a 
chief supported the agreement and his people did not, they had no justification in 
removing him; "ifyou want to change your chiefs, you must have a better reason than 
that:.44 These statements were obviously contradictory, but Jerome, in his quest for 
signatures, was unrestrained by logic. When he explained to the Kiowas that the 
Medicine Lodge Treaty did not interfere with the lease payments until Congress initiated 
the payments for surplus lands, the Kiowas did not relent. He asked Komalty if he "had 
any interest in having it [the surplus land] one or two or three or four years, except to get 
the money," and Komalty responded simply: "That is not our reason:.45 As though he 
had not heard Komalty's answer, Jerome continued to explain the financial benefits of 
selling the land, "tbis is business, the other is not."40 
Conditions rapidly deteriorated on the third day ofnegotiations at Anadarko. 
Governor Jerome, confident the discussions of the previous councils had subdued his 
opponents, began to discuss signing the agreement. Big Tree, having experienced the 
"bulldozing" ofthe Fort Sill Indians, rose to address the commission without the niceties 
ofdiplomacy. He asked the commission for time to speak, and when denied the request a 
second time, asked again, "If you are my friend sit down and listen to me." Jerome 
started to speak: again only to be interrupted by the Kiowa Chief, "I told you to sit down. 
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You told the Indians on Saturday that Monday would be the day to talk, and now my ears 
are stuffed with the words ofthe commission." Governor Jerome enlisted the aid oftbe 
agent who confirmed that the Kiowas had invited the commission to a council and tben 
asked the Indians ifthey had requested the council. Ahpeahtone then answered in the 
affinnative, but added, "When tbe President ofthe United States sent you here did he 
instruct you to talk to these Indians about the sale ofthe surplus lands alone and the 
allotment business, and did he tell you also, outside ofthe general council to get signers 
in a dishonest wayT Jerome immediately stopped the council, but in the ensuing uproar, 
Ahpeahtone made yet another accusation: "You have missed the road and cheated 
them!,,47 
Despite the chaos ofthe Anadarko councils, the Jerome Commission secured the 
requisite number ofsignatures. Whether the commissioners procured the signatures at 
the open councils, or in a "dishonest way," the Jerorne Agreement lists the signatures of 
456 ofthe 562 adult males on the reservation. Although the Indians would later claim 
that the commission had failed to procure the necessary signatures, the agreement, 
according to a clause in the Medicine Lodge Treaty requiring 75 percent ofthe adult 
males to ratify any agreement with the government,was valid.
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After the disagreement 
on the third day ofnegotiations, all oftbe Kiowas and a few ofthe Comanches left the' 
meeting, but tbose who remained received the praises ofthe commission members and 
the agent. On 17 October, the third day ofcouncils, the Jerome Commission completed 
its business on the KCA reservation and left for Washington. 
In its dealings with the Kiowas at Anadarko, the Jerome Commission revealed 
another basic misunderstanding between the Indians and the government and further 
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lowered itself to obtain the precious signatures. For the men on the commission, the 
opportunity to sell land that the Indians could not use, while not missing the opportunity 
to profit from leasing, must have seemed like a genuinely good trade. The Indians, 
however, did not value the land only for its economic potential, but because it provided a 
stable future for their children and represented one ofthe few remaining tangible 
connections to their traditional way oflife. The land was the only inheritance many of 
the poorer Indians could guarantee their offspring. The Indians ofthe reservation 
enjoyed relatively unrestricted control over the reservation. Unimpeded by permanent 
EUTo-American settlements, the KCA reservation contained three million untamed acres 
and was a bastion of tradition for the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches, who had once 
ruled the southern plains. The Jerome Commission's effort to break down the tribal 
government's structure by urging the Indians to act as individuals represents the basest 
method of the negotiators, but it was not without precedent in the general policies ofthe 
federal government. 
The Indians at the Anadarko councils could also draw from this experience in the 
coming struggle against ratification. Because tribal structure suffered attacks from the 
federal government throughout the 18905, the Indians of the KCA reservation dealt with a 
changing power structure throughout their fight against allotment. At least in part 
becauseofhis firm standagainst thecommission, AhpeahtonebecamePrinciple Chiefof 
the Kiowas and made several trips to Washington where he met with powerful allies in 
government. Unfortunately, the accusations against Joshua Given continued after the 
Jerome Commission left. A legend grew up on the reservation that a Kiowa medicine 




Although it is unlikely that the curse was the cause of Given's 
death, the Indians viewed this as validation that Given had in fact misrepresented the 
words of the commission, and continued to press congress for re-negotiations on the basis 
of Given's alleged dishonesty. 
Having suffered defeat at the hands ofDavid Jerome and his cohorts, the Kiowas, 
Comanches, and Apaches prepared to defend their reservation against the invading 
settlers and their representatives in Congress. No amount ofrifles or buffalo could have 
ensured their success in violent resistance. to allotment, and although they had, at times, 
dealt smartly with the Jerome Commission, they had little to show for it. In the eight 
years before Congress ratified the agreement, the Indians would have to forget old 
disputes, disregard traditional tribal politics, and unite in a struggle to prevent the 
allotment oftheir reservation. 
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Chapter ill 
A RESERVATION UNITED 
The Indians of the KCA reservation experienced unprecedented prosperity in the 
eight years between signing the Jerome Agreement and congressional ratification ofthat 
document. Increases in grass payments offset reductions in rations and a cessation of 
annuities. By 1900, the Indians received over two hundred thousand dollars annually 
from the leases, or about $82 per capita, almost sixty dollars more than the Jerome 
Agreement would have provided. Many ofthe reservation's inhabitants maintained herds 
ofcattle for sustenance. Hunger was no longer the most pressing concern of the Indians.
1 
Having arranged a comfortable life for themselves, the headmen ofthe Kiowa, 
Comanche, and Apache tribes focused their energy on preventing, OJ at least delaying, 
allotment and maintaining their open-range lifestyle. 
The Jerome negotiations influenced the Indians' subsequent efforts to resist 
assimilation in several important, though sometimes subtle ways. Despite Governor 
Jerome's frequent efforts to equate his commission with the Great Father at Washington, 
the Indians viewed the two as completely separate entities. This distinction had both 
positive and negative influences on Indian resistance. First, had the Indians not made this 
distinction, they would have expected equally disdainful treatment from Congress, and 
there would have been no reason for them to attempt any further resistance. Many of the 
tactics employed during the negotiations would bring success when employed against the 
government. Second, memories oftbe JeroD1e negotiations created at least an initial 
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distrust oflocal officials that resulted in several unnecessary trips to Washington and 
created friction between agents and the Indians. On more than one occasion, their 
distrust was justified. 
In observing that the only real change made to the original proposal concerned 
additional benefits for white people who had "done service" to the Indians, the leaders of 
the resistance reasoned that white ames could be powerful. Although most ofthe people 
mentioned in the last article ofthe Jerome Agreement had provided little service to the 
Indians, the lesson was not lost on Quanah Parker. As the Principal Chief ofthe 
Comanches through most of the 1890s, Parker was able to increase his influence among 
all three tribes while maintaining mutually beneficial relationships with local 
businessmen and officials. As the middleman of the reservation, he convinced his people 
to offer a select group of outsiders the temporary use ofthe Indians' resources in 
exchange for protection against the massive influx ofpermanent settlers while securing a 
handsome profit for himselfand his people. 
Following Parker's lead, the Indians of the reservation adopted a modem 
resistance to allotment in the years following the Jerome Agreement. Their tactics varied 
from invoking the sympathy ofthose in power to direct confrontations with the President 
ofthe United States. They maintained open channels ofcommunication with some ?f the 
most influential members ofthe government while effecting important changes on the 
local level in both tribal politics and among the agency employees. By the end of this 
tumultuous decade, the Indians ofthe KCA reservation had developed a remarkably 
successful method ofworking within the dOnUnant political structure to effect change, or 
in this case, maintain the status quo. 
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The Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches began their protests before the Jerome 
commission left the reservation, and, even at this early stage, a shift ofpower from the 
agent to the Indians is evident. In a petition dated October 17, the day of the last meeting 
ofthe Jerome commission, J. J. Methvin, a missionary, outlined the grievances ofmore 
than four hundred Indians who attached their signatures or marks? Although Big Tree's 
signature did not appear on the document, Little Robe and Big Bow were among those 
who signed and Ahpeahtone signed twice. This petition, far from the last to be issued by 
the Indians, contained many ofthe arguments the Indians would use throughout the 
1890s. It is also notable because it includes a complaint concerning the Jerome 
commission's decision to hold its meetings at the sub-agency near Fort Sill.
3 
Because the 
agency at Anadarko served as the only legal conduit for the official business ofthe tribes, 
the councils concerning the treaty, held at Fort Sill, were illegal, and thus any agreements 
made at these meetings were illegal. Although this argument was legitimate, it is 
conspicuously absent from all subsequent communications from the reservation.
4 
The Ft. 
Sill argument appears as the first grievance in the petition, implying that the author 
recognized it as the most important. It does not appear in subsequent petitions, however, 
indicating that the Indians, almost from the beginning, controlled more of the struggle for 
. 
their reservation than historians have assumed. Indian arguments against illegal 
ratification focused on the dishonesty of the translators and the insufficient number of 
signatures on the treaty.5 
The remaining grievances in the petition became the most popular arguments 
against the Jerome Agreement. The Indians contended that they had signed the contract 
be,cause they did not understand the temIS. The petition goes on to attack Joshua Given 
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on the basis that he misled the Indians to believe they were to receive $2.00 per acre 
when the treaty only allowed for $1.25. The Indians called for continuing the Medicine 
Lodge treaty of 1867 and requested that they not be "forced to accept a contract which we 
do not want and which would be an injustice to us.,,6 The final paragraph re-iterated the 
desire to renegotiate at the end of the Treaty ofMedicine Lodge, stating, "until then we 
are not ready to treat and we beg that the government protect us in the full rights of that 
treaty."? This plea to the government indicates that the Indians considered the Jerome 
Commission separate from the federal government, and re-asserts the validity ofthe 1867 
treaty to a new opponent. The Indians had begun a new, and more successful, cycle of 
resistance to allotment. 
The Indians did not face an unbending opponent in their second struggle against 
the Jerome Agreement. After examining the tenns ofthe agreement, specifically the 
section which granted benefits to non-Indians, Commissioner Thomas Jefferson Morgan 
ordered Agent Day to "immediately report whether these persons are white men...their 
present occupation, how long they have lived on the Kiowa Reservation, and what special 
services they have rendered the Indians."g President Grover Cleveland, after a meeting 
with several Indians accompanied by Captain Hugh Scott, who was stationed at Fort Sill 
during the Jerome meetings proclaimed, "I will not pennit it [the Jerome Agreement). I 
will see justice done to these Indians as long as I am in power.,,9 Senator Orville Platt of 
Connecticut was among the most vocal supporters ofthe Indians. A trusted ally of the 
Indian Rights Association (IRA), Senator Platt was influential in forestalling the 
allotment of the KCA reservation. I0 
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Lobbying groups such as the IRA, known as "Friends of the Indian" since the 
establishment ofthe first of these groups at the Lake Mohonk Conference, were also 
important allies in the struggle against allotments. Under the leadership ofHerbert 
Welsh, the IRA acted in what it believed to be the benefit ofIndians throughout the 
United States, and although Welsh's opinions concerning the best course for the Indians 
changed throughout this period, the organization maintained an influence over 
government policy. Although the Dawes Act enjoyed support from those who would 
exploit the reservations as well as those who considered themselves "Friends ofthe 
Indian," the reformers sought to delay allotments until they agreed that the Indians were 
prepared for severalty. The progressive reformers, convinced that the Indians must 
assimilate to survive, believed that severalty was the only policy that could ensure the 
continuation ofnative populations.II They advocated a gradual process that stressed the 
importance of an industrial education, private property, and cessation of federal financial 
support. As the difficulties associated with forced allotments became apparent. the IRA 
modified its approach to assisting the Indians.. While still maintaining that assimilation 
was necessary, activists such as Francis Leupp criticized the tactics of groups such as the 
Jerome Commission and stressed the importance ofrecognizing the differences between 
Euro-American and native cultures.12 Most refonnersagreed that the federal 
government had a responsibility to protect the Indians from the influence ofwhites while 
providing an industrial education and monitoring the Indians' gradual progress towards 
mainstream culture. 13 In order to effect this development, lobbyists such as the Indian 
Rights Association maintained an influence in congress after the passage ofthe Dawes 
Act to ensure that the government did not force assimilation on any tribe too quickly. 
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Although these refonners intended to protect the Indians by teaching them traditional 
"American" values, many Native Americans, including the Kiowa, Comanche and 
Apache, vehemently fought severalty, the ultimate goal of assimilationists. However, at 
least in the final decade ofthe nineteenth century, the members ofthe IRA found 
themselves in agreement with the Indians Whom they hoped to assimilate. 
Having detennined that a receptive audience existed in the East, the Indians began 
their crusade against the Jerome Agreement. Through the capable guidance of men like 
Quanah Parker, the Indians adopted flexible means of resistance designed to deal with the 
changing environment ofthe reservation. Rapid tumover among agents between 1892 
and 1894 forced the Indians to evaluate their agents' motives and sympathies and react 
accordingly by either cooperating with or subverting the efforts ofthe agent. Tribal 
factionalism again plagued tbe reservation after 1896, but despite occasional intra-tribal 
conmcts, the Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches remained united in their opposition to 
allotments until the reservation opened to white settlement in 190 I. 14 
Throughout their struggle against severalty, the Indian spokesmen ofthe 
reservation recited a. single, calculated argument against the ratification of the Jerome 
Agreement. Contemporary progressives agreed that if congress opened the reservations 
too quickly, the Indians, lacking a basic understanding ofthe value ofmoney, land, ~nd 
commodities, would lose their estates to dishonest white setHers. 
15 
Thus, the Kiowas, 
Comanches and Apaches emphasized their inability to survive without the protection of 
the reservation. Near the end of their struggle against the agreement, the Indians revealed 
their motivation for continually emphasizing their unfortunate circumstances. Quanah 
Parker, in the first inter-tribal council witb Agent William Walker, recited the Indians' 
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standard argument: "The government has always told these Indians to be like the 
citizens; they are trying hard all the time, but they cannot be citizens...right away; we do 
not understand the way ofthe whites." He further insisted that he wanted the "country to 
remain as it is -not allotted..,16 Because about halfofthe Indians maintained a tribal 
lifestyle in camps scattered around the reservation, this claim was valid, but Parker's 
comments later in the council indicated that he was aware of the argument's impact on 
the progressive refonners. Concluding his statements concerning his people's primitive 
state, Parker characterized the argument as "the words [we] generally use whenever [we] 
see any officer. .. from Washington.,,17 The Indians repeated this argument, with little 
variation, to several government officials, including Commissioner Daniel Browning, 
Morgan's successor at the Bureau ofIndian Affairs. After hearing the Indians' argument, 
Browning promptly "reported to Congress very strongly against [the Jerome 
Agreement]," This instance, only one of many, indicates that the argument was able to 
achieve the desired results. 18 
In the years immediately following the Jerome negotiations, the Indians lacked 
strong leadership from a reliable agent. Captain Hugh G. Brown became the agent in 
July 1893, but lasted only five months before being replaced by Lieutenant Maury 
Nichols. In the absence ofa trusted agent, the Indians; led by Ahpeahtone, found 
alternative methods to address the problems on the reservation. A community of 
squatters had occupied a "disputed" area ofland, known as the Kiowa Strip, on the 
northern border ofthe reservation. Although surveyors had shown the squatters the 
boundaries ofthe reservation, they refused to relocate and threatened violence against the 
officers sent from the agency to move the settlers. 19 Frustrated with their agent's 
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incompetence, the Indians enlisted the help of a missionary to contact the government. 
On 10 June 1894, the Kiowas petitioned Secretary of the Interior Hoke Smith for 
assistance in dealing with the intruders who were "giving our people much trouble with 
their stock and having our people arrested for pretended violation oflaw:,20 Asserting 
that they wanted to use the land in question to take allotments, "when the time comes," 
the Indians asked only that they be given the protection guaranteed them in the Medicine 
Lodge Treaty. To ensure that the secretary understood the good intentions of the Indians, 
they indicated that they had built homes on the northern border ofthe reservation, were 
ra.ising crops, and planned to send their children to school. Because the government was 
unwilling to risk a violent standoff, the squatters remained on the disputed land. In 
bypassing the unproven agent, the Indians showed both the willingness and the ability to 





Major Frank D. Baldwin replaced Lieutenant Nichols as agent for the KCA in 
November 1894. Although Baldwin's temper had on occasion combined with alcohol to 
create less than harmonious relationships, most ofthe Indians considered him an ally in 
their struggle against severalty. He quickly gained a reputation for his intolerance of 
white intruders on the reservation and traders who took advantage of their Indian 
custorners.
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Baldwin secured his relationship with the Indians through a series ofreports 
and letters to the Commissioner ofIndian Affairs in which he praised the inhabitants of 
the reservation for their rapid progress towards "civilization," but pleaded with congress 
not to "enact any law that will open this reservation to settlement for at least five years." 
At which time, "these people will be in good condition to take their places side by side 
with whites of good character.,,22 Although he recommended the eventual opening of the 
reservation, most ofthe Indians realized that they would ultimately lose their land, and, 
therefore, respected Baldwin's attempts to delay the inevitable. 
Unfortunately, in his efforts to rid the reservation of undesirable elements, Agent 
Baldwin created a much more dangerous problem for himself and the Indians.. In his 
capacity as agent, Baldwin recommended approval, renewal, or denial of trading licenses 
on the reservation. After noting exorbitant prices in the limited number oftrading posts 
on the reservation, Baldwin recommended the licensing of additional traders to increase 
competition. He convinced the Indians to invest twenty-five thousand dollars oftheir 
grass payments in a school and later persuaded them to spend fifty thousand dollars on 
stock cattle at the same time they were in debt to the traders for about forty thousand 
dollars?3 As they watched their pro.fits disappear, the traders retained the services of 
William Shelly, the attorney who represented the Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches in 
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depredation cases in Washington. Shelly had been employed by the Indian service, and 
had numerous contacts in the Department of the Interior. Through these contacts, Shelly 
built an impressive coalition that included Commissioner Daniel Browning and Special 
Agent Gilbert B. Prey against Agent Baldwin. Meanwhile, the traders managed to 
convince William Tivis and Big Looking Glass, both Comanches, Lone Wolf, his brother 
Chaddlekonke, and several others to support them against the agent. Abpeahtone, 
Quanah Parker, and Apache John, who represented most ofthe Indians, supported their 
agent, but not without risking their power on the reservation. 
As tension mounted between the two groups, Shelly used his connections to 
attack Baldwin's supporters. Commissioner Browning charged Parker and Ahpeahtone 
with polygamy and relieved them of their positions on the Court of Indian Offenses. He 
replaced them with Frank Moetah and Chaddlekonke, both Shel1y supporters. In another 
attack on Baldwin's authority, Browning renewed the trading license ofDudley Brown, a 
trader who allegedly abused his position by running cattle on the reservation illegally. 24 
Baldwin's supporters among the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches quickly 
reacted to the efforts of the Shelly faction, and as a reSUlt, factionalism reigned on the 
reservation from 1895 until 1898, when William T. Walker replaced Baldwin. Samuel 
Strauss, who operated a trading post near Fort Sill, sent a petition, signed by severa.l 
members of the anti-Baldwin faction, to Commissioner Browning. The petitioners 
complained that the government had failed to fulfill its obligations as outlined in the 
Medicine Lodge Treaty and insisted on more services. The Indians further requested that 
the commissioner "write direct to one ofthe chiefs," after considering the petition. In an 
attempt to give the document legitimacy, the transcriber included the phrase "Done in 
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open council" at the bottom of the last page. 25 Although the document did not blame the 
problems on Agent Baldwin, the petitioning Indians subverted Baldwin's authority by 
enlisting Strauss' assistance. The commissioner noticed this irregularity, and in an 
"infonnal talk" with Lone Wolf, Parker, Eschiti, and Red Elk, asked Eschiti about the 
petition. Eschiti defended Strauss. saying the trader "had nothing to do with the writing 
ofthe letter," and asserted that a clerk had written it.26 
Eschiti and Lone Wolf introduced new charges against Baldwin in their infonnal 
talk with the commissioner. Both ofthe Indians complained about the cost ofthe school 
to be built near Mount Scott. Baldwin convinced the Indians to appropriate twenty-five 
thousand dollars to assist the government in building a school ofsufficient size to 
accommodate all the children on the reservation. Chaddlekonke intimated that Baldwin 
pressed the decision on them and that they no longer agreed to the proposition. He also 
suggested that the agent had refused to distribute grass payments due to the Indians.27 In 
the ensuing months, Shelly and the traders brought charges against Baldwin that included 
not only Chaddlekonke's concerns. but also claims ofmisuse of government property, 
stealing Indian money designated for house building, and excessive drinking. Special 
Agent Province McConnick arrived on the reservation in December of 1896 and on 
Christmas Eve, he began his search for evidence in an'inter-tribal. McCormick ask~ the 
Indians if, in a council held at Lime Creek, they had made the decision to fund the school 
"oftheir own free will and accord. of their own consent and without anybody telling them 
that they must do it.,,28 The Indians' answers expose a deep rift between the factions. 
Quanah Parker, quick to understand McCormick's motives, answered first. He indicated 
that Baldwin called them together and gave them the proposal. Parker insisted that after 
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their agent had explained the proposal he did not pressure the Indians to accept it. 
Recognizing a possible reason for the question, Parker admitted that he expressed to 
Commissioner Browning his desire for the government to defray all ofthe costs ofthe 
school, but added that after the government refused, he willingly agreed to appropriate 
the money. Ahpeatone echoed Parker's statements, but added that the proposal was 
presented three times and everyone had the opportunity to think about it before making a 
decision. Ahpeatone mentioned the people who were opposed to the school, but asserted, 
"they wouldn't be crazy or foolish enough to undo what [has been] done for my 
people.,,29 
Chaddlekonke initiated the opposition's counter-argument. He testified that he 
knew nothing ofthe school until he saw the papers in Commissioner Browning's office. 
Upon returning to the reservation, the Indians had a meeting with Agent Baldwin who 
was angry because they had complained to the commissioner. Chaddlekonke testified 
that he and Lone Wolfleft, and Parker then decided to support the school. Big Looking 
Glass told the inspector that he had attended the Lime Creek Council and had not heard 
anything about the school and certainly had not seen a vote. He continued with an attack 
on Baldwin. According to Big Looking Glass, the agent spoke harsWy to the Indians, 
saying, "you red people here, I want you to listen to me." He promised that ifthe In.dians 
signed the proposal the reservation would not be allotted and Big Looking Glass 
contended that those who wanted to appropriate the money only did so because they 
thought it would save the reservation.
3o 
McCormick continued his interrogation in search 
ofdamning evidence against Baldwin, and having achieved limited success, returned to 
Washington to prepare for the trial. Although both groups probably stretched the truth to 
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fit their purposes, Ahpeatone's testimony is probably most accurate. More important, the 
factious nature ofthe reservation was becoming apparent and threatened to destroy the 
unified front necessary to combat the Jerome Agreement. 
Not one to hide from his adversaries, Baldwin addressed the Big Looking Glass 
faction in council on 27 March 1897. The fiery military man addressed his "bitter 
enemies" by name and warned them to "shut their talk off," adding, "this William Tivis 
can't talk truth at all; I know these people are my enemies, and they must stop their 
talking.,,31 Howeah and Myhecoby, the Comanches who responded to Baldwin's 
accusations, argued that their councils were not intended to disrupt the agency's activities 
but that Captain Hugh Scott was planning to accompany them on a trip to Washington to 
discuss the Jerome Agreement. Baldwin dismissed the idea ofCaptain Scott going to 
Washington without his expenses being paid, and attacked the opposing faction for its 
practice oftaxing each Indian fifty cents to fund trips to the capital. In crisp military 
fashion, Baldwin reminded the Indians, "I have got the money to pay their 
expenses...[and]aslong asIamtheirAgentI shallselectthepeoplethatIwanttogoasa 
delegation to Washington.,,32 
Quanah Parker then attempted to calm the agent. He recited the Indians' most 
reliable argument to massage Baldwin's sympathies, arld after he had described the 
helpless state ofhis people, Baldwin offered to visit them on their farms and extended the 
time allotted for the meeting. Unfortunately for the Comanche chief, the anti-Baldwin 
faction, as represented in this council, was actually an anti-Parker faction. Bert Arko, 
captain ofthe Indian police force and a Comanche, suggested that Parker wanted to open 
the reservation for settlement and, without mentioning names, referred to a "certain chief 
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[who] was the first one to touch the pen" at the Jerome meetings. He asserted, "the man 
who first signed this treaty must have been crazy," and recommended that the Comanches 
"discard these men and put in others, appoint some other chief.")) The council ended 
with the election ofa new delegation to Washington. Ahpeahtone, respected for his stand 
against the Jerome Commission, Big Looking Glass, and Apache John represented both 
the Baldwin and Shelly factions, but Quanah Parker had been the victim ofa rare, but 
malicious intra-tribal assault on his character. Confrontations ofthis sort were 
uncommon, to say the least, among the Indians ofthe KCA reservation. This attempted 
"coup" illustrates the seriousness with which the Indians approached the struggle against 
severalty. Unfortunately, Euro-American instigators understood the situation and 
successfully used their knowledge to divide the Indians. Agent Baldwin did not fail in 
his promise to select the delegation. Parker ITlade the trip to Washington with 
Ahpeahtone and the Fort Sill officer.
J4 
Captain Scott, who claimed neutrality during the Jerome negotiations, clearly 
influenced Arko, Myhecoby, and Howeah, although, aside from an occasional free trip to 
Washington, his motives are unclear. He corresponded with the new Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, William A. Jones, and kept the Big Looking Glass faction abreast of 
developments in Washington, occasionally producing apetition for the Indians to sign.35 
In January of the previous year, Parker alerted Commissioner Browning to the subversive 
activities ofthen Lieutenant Scott who tried "to do things outside ofthe Agent and 
[caused] the Indians to pull apart.,,36 Although Parker maintained an anti-allotment 
stance throughout the decade, Scott convinced some ofthe Indians that the Chiefofthe 
Comanches wanted to open the reservation. 
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Pressure from the traders continued to mount against the agent, and in April of 
1897, the agency hosted a hearing, under the authority ofthe Secretary ofthe Interior, to 
try Baldwin on charges ofdrunkenness, misappropriation ofgovernment funds, and 
misuse ofgovernment property. The traders had become increasingly dissatisfied with 
Major Baldwin, who had encouraged the Indians to participate in a government-housing 
program. The government provided the necessary materials and for a fee offifty dollars, 
the Indians hired workers to build the houses. Many of the Indians participated, and 
having spent such a large portion oftheir grass payments on housing, they had no money 
to pay their often-substantial debts to the reservation's traders.
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The trial afforded the 
Indians a unique opportunity to protect their agent from outside threats. 
Although Inspector McCormick had identified several Indians as potential 
witnesses for the prosecution, none ofthem offered any damning evidence in their 
testimony. When presented with specific questions concerning the alleged wrongdoings 
oftheir agent, the Indians generally responded with a simple, "I didn't hear anything 
aboutthat.',38 Muchtothechagrinoftheprosecutor,all ofhiswitnessestestifiedthat if 
they had paid for houses, they had received them or were about to receive them. After 
failing to illicit the desired responses from several Indian witnesses, the prosecutor called 
John D. Jackson, a Kiowa and official governrnent translator for the proceedings, to 
testify against the agent. Convinced that Baldwin had a hand in the surprising events of 
the afternoon, the prosecutor accused Jackson ofworking with the agent to persuade the 
Indians "to stand by the Major and be his friend in tbis investigation." Jackson replied 
that he "didn't say it that way," and explained that the Indians bad discussed their agent 
at a grass payment before they knew about the hearings. In a conversation with some of 
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the Rainy Mountain Kiowas, Jackson advised the Indians to "learn by white man ways. 
Ifany white man tell us anything, straight roads, honest ways, we go that way; but if any 
whiteman[is]nothonest...we[should]not followthatman.,,39 Hisunnecessary 
confession revealed the motives of the witnesses who almost certainly altered the 
testimony Inspector McCormick heard. The Indian witnesses protected the agent with 
whom they had fonned a beneficial relationship and trusted to act on their behalf in his 
position ofpower.4o 
Although Commissioner Jones dropped the charges against Baldwin, tribal 
factionalism continued to plague the reservation. The anti-Parker faction, now led by 
Eschiti, held unauthorized councils that increasingly threatened Parker's dominance 
among the Comanches and on tbe reservation. Parker worked with his agent, often 
through private correspondence and secret councils, to neutralize his opposition. On 9 
December 1897, Baldwin received word that the Anti-Parker faction had elected Eschiti 
as Chiefofthe Comanches.
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This coup, supported by approximately thirty Indians, 
marked the beginning of an intense struggle for power on the reservation. Parker 
reported the illegal council the following day and informed the agent that Eschiti and his 
followers "were working against you and myself in the interest ofMr. Shelly." He 
added, "that the Commissioner [oflndian Affairs] told them...to hold the council and to 
. 
getMr. Strauss...to writedowntheirwishes andsenddirectto[theCommissioner]and 
not through the Agent." Parker then suggested that Baldwin question Arco, who had 
been asked by Eschiti to sign a petition, about the group's activities.
42 
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Baldwin responded with a strongly worded letter to Commissioner Jones. The 
Major blamed Jones for the factionalism and accused him ofcollusion with the Shelly 
party. 
It is very evident to me that you are fully under control of that gang 
ofpeople who have heretofore defrauded and cheated the Indians and you 
must bear I mind that I am not going to be a party to it. 
Ever since you have been here there has been more disturbance 
and more trouble among the Indians than has existed her for the past three 
years, and it has all been brought about by [your] influence.
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Agent Baldwin was able to be so frank with the Commissioner because he was a military 
officer and was protected by powerful people outside the Department of the Interior.44 
However, his letter did little to stem divisiveness on the reservation. 
Baldwin took drastic action when his opponents threatened to send a delegation to 
Washington. Robert Dunlap, an agency farmer, warned Baldwin that there had been a 
second illegal council at which the Indians decided to go to Washington "whether you 
reckomende [sic] it or no1.,.45 Baldwin, who was in Rush Springs on agency business, 
sent a confidential telegram to E.F. Burton, the agency farmer who first reported the 
election of Eschiti. Burton was to conduct a co:mcil at Fort Sill to be attended by the 
"principal Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches.'>46 The secret council elected Parker,. 
Ahpeatone, Apache John and several others to the dele~ation, "should they be called 
upon by the Department officials," but "did not want Lucius and Lone Wolf.,>47 
Although the secrecy surrounding this council damaged the legitimacy ofthe election, it 
is doubtful that the agent chose to call a secret council because he wanted to subvert the 
will of the majority ofIndians. More people signed the proceedings ofthe council than 
attended the anti-Parker faction's meetings. Baldwin's council also included the chiefs 
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council members, and headmen ofthe Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches. He most likely 
insisted on secrecy to avoid interference from Strauss, Scott, or other opposition 
influences on the reservation. 
Soon thereafter, Baldwin was recalled to active military duty to serve in the 
Spanish-American War. Before he left, an open inter-tribal council voted to dismiss their 
trouble-making attorney and hire another. Parker remained the most stable force on the 
reservation. Despite the efforts of Special Agent Prey, who visited the reservation to 
plead for his friend's job after Baldwin had gone, the Indians remained flITO in their 
decision to seek legal representation elsewhere. William T. Walker replaced Baldwin, 
but he lasted onJy a year before Colonel James F. Randlett took control ofthe agency. 
Randlett's tenure saw the Indians Wlify in their efforts to prevent the hated agreement's 
ratification. 
The turmoil ofprevious years had not been a purely negative influence on the 
Indians. The anti-Baldwin faction, some ofwhom later became important in the struggle 
against the Jerome Agreement, developed the skills needed to communicate with the 
., federal government without the assistance ofthe agent. When they knew Baldwin did 
not support their efforts, they enlisted the help of like-minded whites to petition for 
changes on the reservation. Without financial support from the grass fund, also 
controlled by the agent, the Indians in the Eschiti faction created a grass-roots campaign 
to fund trips to the capital with a tax on their supporters. They demonstrated 
independence by holding councils to discuss matters ofgreat importance against 
Baldwin's wishes. Although they were most likely only pawns in the larger battle 
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between Shelly and Baldwin, the Indians of the Eschiti faction nevertheless demonstrated 
the will and ability to resist what they perceived to be the proponents of allotment. 
Quanah Parker and his followers also gained some skills they would later need to 
stage an effective resistance to the Jerome Agreement. Having chosen sides in the larger 
struggle between Shelly and Baldwin, the Indians protected their agent from attacks from 
officials in Washington and. in return, relied on him to defend them against the efforts of 
Eschiti and his fonowers. Parker and Ahpeahtone maintained a united front, and in so 
doing, were able to secure the support ~fmost ofthe Indians on the reservation. They 
learned to deal verbally with their opponents as enemies. Most importan.t, Parker 
emerged as the principal chief ofthe Comanches, and was generally recognized as the 
leaderoftheIndians onthe KCA reservation.48 
Parker earned the respect of the Indians through his leadership in tribal councils. 
Throughout the 1890s, he influenced the official action of the Indians as determined in 
randomly scheduled inter-tribal councils. These councils served as the basic fonn of 
tribal government on the reservation. Although only the headmen usually spoke, all 
males voted. Despite the democratic nature of the councils, most decisions were 
unanimous. The headmen spoke extensively on the matters before the council and agreed 
on a course of action before taking a vote. Although this system also allowed for 
significant latitude in the selection of delegations, a core of experienced leaders usually 
represented the reservation. Ahpeahtone and Lone Wolfrepresented the Kiowa, Apache 
John spoke for his tribe, and Quanah Parker traveled to Washington as a member ofaU 
but one ofthe delegations.
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These men were all opposed to the agreement, regardless of 
their opponents' perceptions, and they understood the workings ofthe government. They 
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were able to identify their supporters and convey the wishes of their people. By sending 
representatives to Washington, the Indians ofthe reservation undoubtedly gained a sense 
ofcomfort and importance, and although these delegations represented the most direct 
contact with the federal government, there is little evidence that they provided an 
opportunity to exert more influence than was possible from the reservation. Tribal 
councils, held at various locations, served as the most powerful vehicle for the Indians to 
resist severalty. 
The Indians of the reservation found, in their tribal councils, a means of 
communication with the commissioner without interference from the agent. The minutes 
of each official inter-tribal council were fOIWarded without alteration to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The language of the speakers indicates that they were 
constantly aware ofthis channel ofcommunication. The proceedings increasingly 
contained statements directed not to anyone in attendance, but to the "government." 
William T. Walker replaced Baldwin in 1898, and in the absence ofa trustworthy 
agent, the Indians resorted to direct communic-ation with the Commissioner oflndian 
Affairs. In a council held shortly after Walker's arrival, Pahkotoquodle, a Kiowa, 
addressed the assembly: "Now, he said what we write down on this paper we try to send 
to government and I hope they see this paper and help us and do something for us."so. 
Quanah Parker dominated the Indians' first meeting with their new agent. He 
spoke first, claiming "we are only children" and assured Walker that "everything is going 
smoothly." Parker then began the business of the meeting.
Sl 
The Indians had called the 
council to express the desire for 640-acre allotIllents as opposed to 160-acre parcels 
provided for in the Jerome Agreement. Parker addressed the council, proposing that in 
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order to be self-sufficient the Indians would need four times the land allowed in the 
Jerome Agreement. He further suggested that the surplus land be reserved for the use of 
their children. In offering a rationale for his proposition, Parker estimated the number of 
Indians on the reservation to be three thousand. He placed the number ofavailable acres 
atabout 3.5 million, arguingthat"ifthegovernnlentagreesto give...640 acresto each 
one ofthese Indians there would be just a few acres left. 52 Congress did not accept 
Parker's proposal, but accepted some important modifications in the agreement. 
Congress certainly had access to the minutes ofthese councils, and Parker's suggestions 
clearly had an impact on the altered agreement ratified fourteen months after this council. 
The Jerome Agreement, in its final fonn, assigned an additional 480,000 acres to be held 
in common by the three tribes.53 This allowed an extra 160 acres for each of the three 
thousand Indians in Parker's estimation. Although there is no conclusive link between 
the two, one might assume that congress considered these council proceedings when 
deciding the acreage for the ''Big Pastures" because the actual population noted by the 
agent in annual reports would have resulted in a much smaller allowance. The IRA was 
also involved in the effort to secure larger allotments for the Indians, but their proposals 
also used the figures supplied in the annual reports ofthe agent. Assuming that congress 
arrived at the figure for the reserve pastures through some manner oflogic, Parker's 
estimation provides the most reasonable route to 480,000 acres. 
The Indians also used the tribal councils to establish laws to protect the 
reservation from outside influences. In response to the threat to tribal unity posed by 
traders and white men who had married into the tribes, the Indians gathered in council in 
the summer of 1897. Ahpeahtone suggested a laW "that no white man, or colored man. or 
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Mexican marry [any] Indian at alL" Men who violated this law were subject to 
immediate removal from the reservation. To deal with men who bad already married into 
the tribes, Ahpeabtone asserted that Indian coUrts should handle any divorce involving an 
Indian.
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His proposals carried unanimously and became law on the reservati.on. 
Through their councils, the Indians found new allies in the struggle against 
allotment by authorizing the sale of land to other tribes or government agencies or the 
lease ofland to businesses. The Indians made land and resources available in arder to 
increase the number of influential peop~e who opposed the opening ofthe reservation. 
Parker, motivated only by the annual payments, had successfully persuaded his people to 
lease the surplus land to ranchers, but after 1892 the Jerome Agreement constantly 
threatened the integrity ofthe reservation. Texas ranchers, who valued their exclusive 
rights to the vast pastures ofthe reservation, opposed severalty with the same vigor as the 
Indians. However, as the acres available for lease grew scarce, the councils also invited 
mining companies to the reservation in the search for additional allies. Quanah Parker 
proposed that gypsum miners be allowed on the reservation because, "the men who 
wanted the lease would become friends to the Indians and help them keep their country 
same as the cow men."S5 Parker's proposal, carefully debated, carried the council 
unanimously, and the Indians enjoyed the support of another special interest group on the 
reservation. 
In 1897 Congress sent an attorney for the Wyandotte tribe to the KCA reservation 
to negotiate the sale ofenough land to provide each ofihe 203 members a 160-acTe tract. 
The members ofthe council, once again led by Quanah Parker, seized the opportunity to 
send a message to Washington. The council lasted four days. After each session of the 
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council, the Indians retired to their camps to discuss the events ofthe day. Because ofthe 
drastic changes ofopinion evidenced in this council, it provides a unique insight into 
understanding Parker's influence among the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches. 
The first day ofthe council began with a speech by the lawyer for the 
Wyandottes. Although the lawyer was a member ofthe tribe he represented, the Indians 
of the KCA reservation believed he looked "like a white man.,,56 Parker, realizing the 
potential to reach a compromise with congress, addressed the council first. He argued that 
he had no objections to the proposal "if [Congress] should make a law on this reservation 
that it should be occupied by Indians," not only the Wyandottes, "but any other 
Indians.,,57 Other citizens ofthe reservation did not share this opinion. White Man, a 
Comanche,citedthe colorofthemixed-blood'sskininhisprotest ofthesale. ''Thisman 
I see him first time, andhe...lookto metoomuchwhite.. .ifhelookedlikeme, redman, 
I would not be so scared.,,58 As the council closed its first day ofbusiness, the prospects 
seemed poor for an agreement on the sale of land to the Wyandottes. 
After discussing the proposition that night, most oftbe speakers reversed their 
positions. Ahpeahtone, the most revered ofthe Kiowa Chiefs, opened the council with 
the argument that all subsequent speakers echoed, "1 [would] like to have Congress be 
good enough to do as we ask," he explained, "to make the agreement that we [are] wining 
to sell this land to the Wyandotte Indians ifCongress makers] a law making this country 
just for the Indians, but ifthey don't make a law to make this country an Indian country, 
we will not sell the land to the Wyandotte Indians.',59 In an attempt to make the deal 
more appealing,. they agreed to sell the land for only $1.25 per acre, approximately half 
the amount they supposedly agreed to in the JeroI1le Agreement. The minutes ofthis 
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council meeting clearly indicate a quid pro quo, and an assertion ofthe right ofthe tribes 
to renounce the agreement in the case of congress' failure to pass an acceptable law. This 
overnight revolution also indicated that Parker's foresight and powers ofpersuasion 
dominated the reservation's political scene. He convinced the Indians, who had been 
vehemently opposed to the proposal, to unite in the hope that congress would reciprocate 
their kindness and allow only Indians to settle on the reservation. Although congress did 
not comply with the Indians' wishes, the actions ofthe council most likely prevented 
ratification ofthe Jerome Agreement. . 
The next year, having allowed congress ample time to comply with its terms, an 
inter-tribal council unanimously withdrew its offer to the Wyandottes, but not without 
dreadfulconsequences.
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Threemonthslater theagentreceivedaletterwarning ofthe 
probability that congress would vote to ratify the Jerome agreement in the current 
session. On 6 June ]900, Congress approved a revised fonn of the agreement.
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The 
new document allowed an additional 480,000 acres to be held in common but maintained 
the original price ofthe surplus lands, which amounted to just under a dollar an acre.
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Ahpeahtone accepted the bad news gracefully. He remarked: "Here is something 
different and good.. .let us all try to stand together and not let somebody else pull us 
another way." 63 Although the Indians sent a delegation to Washington to verify the 
agent's story, most had accepted the report and prepared for the end of the reservation by 




The Jerome Agreement, an imminent threat to the survival ofthe Kiowas, 
Comanches and Apaches in the last eight years ofthe nineteenth century, nevertheless 
sparked remarkable adaptation to the dominant society among many Indians ofthe 
reservation. Drawing on their experiences with the Texas ranchers, the Jerome 
Commission, and tribal factionalism, Quanah Parker, Ahpeahtone, and others developed 
ingenious methods to stall severalty. Even as they fought the agreement's ratification, a 
new generation, educated at Carlisle, Haskell, or one ofthe reservation schools, was 
moving into positions ofpower in tribal government. Young men such as Delos K. 
Lonewolf, Howard White Wolf, and John Jackson would carry the work oftheir 
forbearers into the twentieth century.' Although they eventually lost the battle for their 
reservation, the aging Indian leadership managed to carry their people through a final 
struggle to preserve the reservation, a final remnant ofthe free roaming way oflife they 
had enjoyed before the arrival ofEuro-Americans. 
, 
Throughout the reservation period, Quanah Parker was the most constant figur.e of 
authority on the reservation. History has not yet decided on Parker's legacy. Some argue 
that he was merely a puppet ofthe ranchers who leased the grasslands ofthe reservation, 
that his motivation for preventing allotment was financial. He was on the rancher's 
payroU, and maintained friendly correspondence with several ofthe Texans who 
frequently visited the Comanche chiefat the house they had built for him. Some 
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historians also blame Parker for the Jerome Commission's success on the KCA 
reservation, "IfQuanah had chosen to use his power against the commissioners," William 
T. Hagan has written, "there was no way enough signatures could have been obtained to 
legitimatize the agreement...
2 
Few serious historians give Parker credit for acting in the 
behalf ofhis people in the struggle to forestall allotments. 
While Parker did enjoy the benefits ofhis association with powerful white men on 
and off the reservation, his main concern was the welfare ofhis people. He did not 
abandon his culture to please those whq used him as a middleman to the Indians. 
Because he was indispensable to those who wanted to influence the Comanches, Parker 
secured the continuation of several important cultural trad.itions. Agents often ignored 
Parker's association with the ·peyote religion, As a rcsu.lt, the [ndialls who subscribed to 
Peyotism did not suffer persecution, as did the Ghost Dancers on the reservation. As a 
leader of the peyote religion, Parker successfully lobbied the Oklahoma legislature to 
defeat a bill to end Peyotism.
3 
Always aware ofthe importance ofmoney to the survival 
ofhis people, Parker took advantage ofevery opportunity to increase the Comanches' 
income. On a trip to Washington, probably financed by the ranchers, he urged 
Commissioner Browning to resurvey the leased grasslands of the reservation to ensure 
that the cattlemen were paying the Indians for each acre they llsed.
4 
During the Jerome 
negotiations, it is likely that Parker, denied the services ofhis lawyer, believed the 
commission's threats that if the Indians did not accept the agreement congress would take 
their surplus lands without payment. Although he did give his support to the agreement, 
he attempted to negotiate for more favorable tenus and lmdoubtedly thought he was 
acting in the best interests ofhis people.
5 
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The Jerome negotiations were a unique phenomenon on the reservation. 
Governor Jerome and his cohorts used, to say the least, underhanded tactics to subdue 
their opponents in the negotiations. The cOmmission planted John Hall to persuade the 
Indians to act against their own best interests. In securing the support of Agent Day, the 
commission prevented the Indians from receiVing assistance from impartial parties 
outside the reservation. Though he would later become a vocal opponent ofallotments, 
Hugh Scott, unique because of his association with the Indians before, during, after the 
negotiations, claimed neutrality during the councils when his advice would have been 
most useful to the Indians. 
The commission also refused to treat the Indians as equals in the negotiations. 
Although Parker, Tabananaka, and others genuinely attempted to negotiate with the 
commission, Governor]erome was unyielding. The commissioners dismissed the 
Indians' efforts to set a price per acre as opposed to a lump sum for the surplus lands. 
When legitimate arguments arose against the agreement, Jerome simply distracted the 
Indians with a long-winded speech that addressed everything lexcept the issue at hand. 
Big Tree attempted to level the negotiations by pointing out that the commission 
monopolized the floor during the proceedings. Governor Jerome, dictator ofthe 
negotiations, instead dismissed the uncooperative Indians and continued with only those 
who were willing to consent to the agreement. 
Although they had few successes in the negotiations, the Indians' political 
resistance to assimilation had an opportunity to develop in the face ofthe monolithic 
Jerome Commission. Operating under the advice of his contacts in the government, 
Parker attacked the commission's legitimacy, creating doubts in the minds of his 
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constituency. OnceJeromehadregainedhis authoritytospeakon behalfofthe 
government, Parker entered the negotiations.. In light ofthe commission's refusal to wait 
for the expiration ofthe Medicine Lodge Treaty and the agent's refusal to allow an 
attorney to assist the Indians, Parker proposed a two month intermission during which 
time the Indians could discuss the proposal and come to a complete understanding of the 
document. Although his efforts were fruitless, the negotiations provided important 
lessons in the art ofcompromise. Other Indians, though not as seasoned as Parker, 
benefited from their experience with the Jerolne Commission. Because ofhis finn stance 
against the agreement, Ahpeahtone rapidly emerged as a leader among his people. Most 
importantly, after the commission returned to Washington with the signed agreement, the 
Indians ofthe reservation, long divided by the issue ofleases., united in their opposition 
to allotment. 
In numerous petitions against impending sev,eralty, the Indians contended that the 
Jerome Commission had coerced or tricked the Indians into signing the agreement. The 
legitimacy ofthese arguments is questionable. Joshua Given's status as a traitor to the 
Kiowas remains in question, and his complicity may never be determined; but several 
important details indicate that he did not deceive the Kiowas. Although Given's 
translations came into question on three separate occasions during the negotiations, each 
time Governor Jerome allowed additional translators to monitor Given's work. The 
monitors never reported a problem with the translation during the meetings. Big Tree, 
who was responsible for most ofthe accusations. altered his story on more than one 
occasion. At the Fort Si1I meetings, the Kiowa headman proposed a $1.50 per acre price 
on the surplus lands and a three-year waiting period before the agreement took effect. 
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While attending the Anadarko meetings, Big Tree claimed that Given told the Indians 
that they would receive two dollars per acre for the surplus lands after a four-year waiting 
period.
6 
In the petitions issued from the reservation after 1894, the Indians claimed they 
were told that the land was to sell for $2.50 per acre.
7 
Guilty or not, Given died ofa 
brain hemonhage shortly after the negotiations, solidifying the Indians' beliefthat they 
had been lied to by one oftheir own. 
Other arguments against ratification were more reasonable. The Indians asserted 
that the Jerome Commission did not secure a sufficient number ofsignatures. They 
acknowledged that the 456 names that were on the document would have been the 
requisite 75 percent ofadult males on the reservation. They pointed out, however, that 
several Indians had asked to have their names removed, and several white men had also 
signed. IfJerome had removed their names, the agreement would have fallen short ofthe 
required signatures. Citin.g article ten ofthe agreement, in which several white persons 
received the benefits reserved for tribal members, the Indians argued that these people 
unduly influenced their decision to sign the agreement. Finally, the Indians attacked the 
methods ofthe Jerome Commission. Citing coercive tactics and dishonest representation 
ofthe Indians' rights under the Dawes Act, the petitioners asked that Congress discard 
8
the agreement.A review ofthe minutes of the Jerome ~eetings substantiates each ot: 
these claims. These petitions indicated to observers in Congress that the Indians were 
united in the struggle against severalty, and although these documents represented the 
concerns of a great majori ty of the Kiowas Comanches, and Apaches, tribal factionalism " 
threatened to weaken the Indians' effort to prevent allotment. 
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Eum-American agitators in Washington created tension among the reservations' 
Indians throughout the tenure ofAgent Frank Baldwin. Led by their attorney William 
Shelly, who also represented the Indians in depredations cases, traders and non-Indian 
men who married members ofone ofthe tribes, fanned the fires oftribal factionalism. 
Having been accosted by Agent Baldwin for their transgressions against the Indians, 
these men persuaded a group ofIndians led by Big Looking Glass and Eschiti, to oppose 
Quanah Parker and his ally Baldwin. Although both factions opposed the opening of the 
reservation, Captain Hugh L. Scott convinced Eschiti and his followers that Parker was 
working with the forces of allotment to end reservation life. Confli.ct between the two 
groups resulted in an attempted coup to unseat the long-time Principal Chief ofthe 
omanches. Because ofthe concerted efforts of Agent Baldwin, Quanah Parker, and 
Ahpeahtone, the Eschiti faction failed and Shelly lost his position as attorney for the 
Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache. 
Through this intense period offactionalism, the Indians in both groups leamed 
valuable skills to forestall allotment. Without the support of the agent, who was the 
official channel for communication between the Indians and the federal government, the 
Eschiti faction found alternative methods to communicate with the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs. By enlisting the services of educated white traders, Eschiti and his 
followers were able to maintain a steady flow ofpetitions to congress and the 
commissioner. Having been denied access to the reservation's grass fund, the anti-
Baldwin faction taxed its supporters to finance all-important trips to the capital. Parker's 
supporters, threatened with the loss oftheir agent, presented evidence to protect Baldwin 
from charges that could have ended the major'S career. During the attempted coup, 
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Ahpeahtone, Parker and the agent communicated efficiently and acted in concert to 
prevent Eschiti's take-over. Because the Eschiti faction separated itselffrom the business 
of the agency, there was little interruption in the official resistance to the Jerome 
Agreement. Although both groups were Working to achieve the same goal, Eschiti and 
his followers, assisted by Captain Scott, continued to oppose Parker until Baldwin and 
Shelly no longer had an influence on the reservation. Reflecting on his experience on the 
KCA reservation, Colonel Randlett obse.rved that although be had been warned about the 
"factions among the bands," but that "there was one thing in which they were united to a 
man, and that was in opposition to the ratification ofthe Jerome Treaty.,,9 
Having developed many ofthe skills necessary to work within the dominant 
society, Parker and Ahpeahtone used tribal government to forestall allotment and to 
improve the terms of the agreement before Congress. Aware that the minutes ofthe tribal 
councils provided an incorruptible channel ofcommunication with the federal 
govenunent, the Indians submitted unofficial compromises to congress and the 
Commissioner ofIndian Affairs in the debate of the meetings. Parker engineered several 
agreements through which the Indians gained allies in their struggle against severalty. 
Drawing on his experiences with the ranchers, who had profited from lucrative leases that 
. 
would not be possible if the reservation were allotted, Parker supported additional leases 
to mineral companies. In an attempt to deal with congress as equals, he convinced the 
Indians, initially hostile to the proposal, to sell land to the absentee Wyandottes in 
exchange for a guarantee that only Indians would be allowed to live on the reservation. 
The KCA reservation was the last of the large tracts ofreadily available land 
opened to non-Indian settlement. The efforts of the Indians contributed, in no small part, 
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to the longevity of the reservation. The efforts ofthe Indian Rights Association also 
undoubtedly helped forestall allotment; but the Indians influence over the IRA should not 
be overlooked. Even Quanah Parker claimed to need the protection of the ''Friends ofthe 
Indian." The Indians understood that they had allies in Washington, and part oftheir 
strategy to forestall allotment was ensuring the continued support ofthose allies. A few 
wealthy Texas ranchers who had leases on the reservation undoubtedly maintained a 
degree of influence with their congressmen, but these elected officials understood the 
consequences ofdenying thousands ofe~anchised settlers two million acres oflush 
pastureland. They would not likely have protected the reservation to maintain the support 
of a dozen cattlemen. Quanah Parker and the Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches did not 
resign themselves to the inevitable and allow their friends to carry on the struggle. That 
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